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and Policy Concerns Arising from 
India’s Microfinance Institutions 
(Development and Regulation) Bill  
By Ashley Becker* 
Abstract: At the end of 2010, India possessed the largest, most concentrated 
microfinance industry in the world.  Initially, Indian microfinance operations 
were funded primarily by the state or charitable donations, but the industry has 
grown to be largely dominated by the private sector.  As this shift occurred, the 
industry became quite profitable, and in the wake of its success, faced a 
significant amount of backlash.  When borrowers in the State of Andhra 
Pradesh, home to a substantial portion of the households utilizing microcredit in 
India, complained of excessive rates and predatory collection practices, the 
State responded by passing a regulation that severely restricted microlending 
practices.  This regulation sharply affected microfinance companies’ profit 
margins and growth rates, and effectively delegitimized the industry.  Following 
adoption of the regulation, historically high collection rates plummeted and 
shares in microfinance companies fell to record lows.  In July of 2011, India’s 
central government released a draft bill, entitled “Micro Finance Institutions 
(Development and Regulation) Bill.”  The Bill provides a national regulatory 
framework for India’s microfinance companies.  Furthermore, the Bill preempts 
existing state regulations, such as the one in Andhra Pradesh.  The State of 
Andhra Pradesh is resisting the Bill, arguing, inter alia, that since India’s 
Constitution explicitly provides states with the power to regulate the 
microfinance industry, it represents an unconstitutional usurpation of state 
power by the federal government.  This Comment argues that in the likely event 
the Bill is passed, Indian courts will hold the adoption of the Bill constitutional, 
since the federal government does, in fact, have the ability to override relevant 
state legislation.  Adoption of the Bill is likely to provide a solution to the 
challenges faced by the microfinance industry.  By providing certainty, defining 
boundaries, and providing a government partner, the Bill will both promote 
development with the currently stagnant microfinance industry and allow it to 
regain some of the legitimacy it lost in the process of state regulation. 
 
 
* J.D., 2013, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., Psychology, 2006, Colgate 
University.  I would like to thank the editors of this Comment for all their hard work and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the end of 2010, India possessed the largest, most concentrated 
microfinance
1
 industry in the world.
2
  Upon its inception in the country 
 
 1  The term microfinance generally “refers to the provision of financial services to low-
income clients, including the self-employed.”  JOANNA LEDGERWOOD, MICROFINANCE 
HANDBOOK: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (1999).  This broad definition 
encompasses an expansive range of services, including microcredit, which involves the 
extension of very small loans to impoverished individuals in order to spur entrepreneurial 
efforts.  Microcredit, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/microcredit
.asp#axzz1dXLmIRKv (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).  In India, however, microfinance is 
defined by the Task Force on Microfinance as the “provision of thrift, credit and other 
financial services and products of very small amounts to the poor in rural, semi-urban or 
urban areas for enabling them to raise their income levels and improve living standards.”  
Anil K. Khandelwal, Microfinance Development Strategy for India, ECON. & POL. WKLY 
1127 (2007).  This Comment adopts India’s more narrow definition of microfinance to refer 
solely to this type of small-scale lending.  Scholarly texts, industry reports, and the Indian 
government use the terms “microcredit” and “microfinance” interchangeably.  In the interest 
of consistency, this Comment will use the term “microfinance.” 
 2  Carlos Ani, India is the World’s Largest Microfinance Industry: M-CRIL, 
PHILDEVFINANCE, http://phildevfinance.blogspot.com/2010/11/india-is-worlds-largest-
microfinance.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2011) [hereinafter M-CRIL] (“India now has the 
largest microfinance industry in the world with the phenomenal growth of 62% per annum in 
terms of numbers of unique clients and 88% per annum in terms of portfolio over the past 
five years and around 27 million borrower accounts.”); see also Rajeshwari Adappa Thakur, 




decades prior, the industry was viewed as a favorable venture that provided 
a path out of poverty for individuals who traditionally lacked access to 
banking and related financial services.
3
  While India has the world’s fourth 
highest gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing power parity
4
 
and the world’s fiftieth fastest-growing economy,5 the country possesses 
historically high poverty rates.
6
  Today, almost 30% of the country’s 1.2 
billion citizens live below the poverty line.
7
  India’s high poverty rates 
presented the ideal opportunity for the implementation of microfinance; by 
offering small loans to impoverished individuals wishing to engage in 
productive activities, the industry provided hope to the country’s poor. 
However, those engaged in microfinance lending did not have wholly 
altruistic intentions.  Microfinance can also be a very profitable business 
model.  For example, the largest microfinance company, SKS Microfinance 
Private Limited (SKS), raised $347 million in an initial public offering 
(IPO) in 2010
8
 and netted over 1.7 billion rupees (31 million U.S. dollars) 
in profits the same year.
9
 
Despite their initial successes, microlenders and investors may have 
overlooked the political risk involved in the industry.  India’s poor possess 
significant political capital in the form of their votes.  When borrowers in 
the State of Andhra Pradesh—home to more than one-third of the 
households that utilize microcredit in India—complained of excessive rates 
and predatory collection practices, the State responded by passing a 
regulation that severely restricted microlending practices.
10
  The regulation 
 
REPORT 23 (2008), available at http://www.ibef.org/download/finance_260908.pdf. 
 3  See Thakur, supra note 2, at 23 (“Increasingly, microfinance is perceived as an 
effective channel for ensuring financial inclusion of the low income population and those in 
the informal sector.”). 
 4  The World Factbook: India, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html (last updated Feb. 
19, 2013) [hereinafter World Factbook]. 
 5  India had GDP real growth rates of 10.6% in 2010 and 7.2% in 2011.  Id. 
 6  Aasha Kapur Mehta & Amita Shah, Chronic Poverty in India: Overview Study 8–9 
(Chronic Poverty Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 7, 2001), http://www.sa-
dhan.co.in/Adls/Microfinance/PerspectivePoverty/ChronicpovertyinIndia.pdf. 
 7  World Factbook, supra note 4. 
 8  Satish Sarangarajan & John Satish Kumar, SKS Microfinance IPO Attracts Strong 
Demand, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2010, at C2, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB100014240527487042718045754052233560
63904.html. 
 9  SKS MICROFINANCE, ANNUAL REPORT: 2010–2011, at 9 (2011), available at 
http://www.sksindia.com/downloads/sks_annual_report_2010_11.pdf.  SKS Microfinance 
reported profits after taxes of 1,739,500,000 rupees (32,341,653.75 U.S. dollars) in FY 2010.  
Id. 
 10  Harsh Joshi, India’s Big Problem with Microfinance, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2011, at 
C22. 
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imposed caps on interest rates, created obligatory registration and 
documentation requirements, and substantially narrowed permissible 
collection practices.
11
  In addition to sharply affecting profit margins and 
growth rates of microlending companies, the regulation effectively 
delegitimized the industry.  As a result, historically high collection rates 
plummeted and shares in microfinance companies fell to record lows.
12
  




In July of 2011, India’s central government released a draft of a new 
microfinance bill, entitled “Micro Finance Institutions (Development and 
Regulation) Bill” (Bill), for comment.14  On May 22, 2012, this Bill was 
introduced to Parliament.
15
  The Bill provides a national regulatory 
framework for India’s microfinance companies, delegating primary 
regulatory authority to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
16
  Furthermore, the 
Bill preempts existing state regulations, such as the one in Andhra 
Pradesh.
17





 11  See Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions (Regulation of Moneylending) Act, 
2010 Andhra Pradesh Gen. Assemb. (2010) (India). 
 12  Joshi, supra note 10.  For a detailed quantitative illustration of the recent drop in 
performance measures among India’s MFIs, see M-CRIL India Indices of Microfinance 
2011, MICRO-CREDIT RATINGS INT’L LTD. (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.m-
cril.com/BackEnd/ModulesFiles/Publication/CRILEX-India-2011_revised.pdf (“Growth in 
2010-11 was just 7.5% for borrowers and 7.2% for portfolio, greatly reduced from the 43% 
and 76% growth respectively in the previous year after adjusting for multiple lending.”). 
 13  Interview by India Knowledge@Wharton with Vijay Mahajan, President, 
Microfinance Institutions Network of India (July 26, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4696) [hereinafter Interview 
with Vijay Mahajan]. 
 14  The Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill, 2011, Acts of 
Parliament, 2011 (India); Government likely to Introduce Micro-Finance Bill in Budget 
Session, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2012, 2:46 PM), 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-01-26/news/30666819_1_finance-
institution-national-housing-bank [hereinafter Budget Session]. 
 15  Vishnu Padmanabhan, The Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) 
Bill, 2012, PRS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (May 25, 2012), 
http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-micro-finance-institutions-development-and-
regulation-bill-2012-2348/; see also The Micro Finance Institutions (Development and 
Regulation) Bill, 2012, No. 62, Acts of Parliment, 2012 (India) (as introduced in Lok Sabha) 
[hereinafter Micro Finance Bill]. 
 16  Micro Finance Bill, supra note 15. 
 17  Id. 
 18  The Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill, 2012, PRS LEGIS. 
RES. BILL TRACK, http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-micro-finance-institutions-





While the reaction to the Bill among industry insiders has been 
favorable as measured by the markets,
19
 the effect it may have on the 
microfinance industry is uncertain.  Andhra Pradesh is resisting the Bill, 
and is expected to argue that because India’s constitution explicitly 
provides states with the power to regulate the microfinance industry, it 
represents an unconstitutional usurpation of state power by the federal 
government.
20
  The Bill’s opponents further argue that the mandated 
association with the RBI is dangerous, because it allows microlenders to 
continue their predatory practices under the authority of their alignment 
with a national institution.
21
 
This Comment argues that in the likely event the Bill is passed, Indian 
courts will hold that the Bill is constitutional because the federal 
government has the ability to override relevant state legislation.  This 
decision would likely provide a solution to the challenges faced by the 
microfinance industry, supplying it with an opportunity for reinvention that 
is crucial to its future success.  This Comment argues that the Bill 
implements the mechanisms necessary to manage
22
 the unregulated 
microfinance industry’s problems; by providing certainty, defining 
boundaries, and providing a government partner, the Bill will both promote 
development within the currently stagnant microfinance industry and allow  
it to regain some of the legitimacy it lost in the process of state regulation. 
Part II of this Comment provides a succinct overview of India’s legal 
infrastructure.  It also provides contextual background for the discussion of 
the Bill’s impact by describing India’s social landscape and how this 
landscape promoted the evolution of microfinance.  Part III examines the 
current status of the microfinance industry in India, focusing on the recent 
state-promulgated regulations adopted by Andhra Pradesh.  Part IV 
discusses the proposed Bill and its reception by various factions in India.  
Part V discusses the arguments proffered by the Bill’s opponents.  
 
 19  See Tripti Lahiri, Markets Cheer Microfinance Draft Law, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2011, 
5:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/07/07/markets-cheer-microfinance-draft-
law/. 
 20  Vineet Rai, India’s Microfinance Bill Offers a Mixed Bag to Investors, CONSULTATIVE 
GROUP ASSIST POOR (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.cgap.org/blog/india-microfinance-bill-
offers-mixed-bag-investors; V. Umakanth, The New Microfinance Institutions Bill, INDIAN 
CORP. L. (July 15, 2011, 3:02 PM), http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.com/2011/07/new-
microfinance-institutions-bill.html. 
 21  KV Ramana, Andhra Pradesh Lambasts Microfinance Bill, Wants Full Rethink, 
DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS (July 9, 2011, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report_andhra-pradesh-lambasts-microfinance-bill-wants-
full-rethink_1563902. 
 22  The topic of microfinance has been aptly described as a case of “micro-management” 
by one Indian news outlet.  See Micro-Mismatch, INDIAN EXPRESS (July 8, 2011, 3:56, AM), 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/micromismatch/814369/.  The title of this Comment is 
a play on words referencing this description. 
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Specifically, it examines whether the Bill represents an unconstitutional 
usurpation of power, concluding that Parliament will be able to effectively 
argue that the Bill is constitutional.  Part V also addresses the Bill’s public 
policy implications and suggests that the Bill promotes regulations that 
benefit both the microfinance industry and its intended customers.  Finally, 
Part VI offers some concluding thoughts about the future of the 
microfinance industry in India. 
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
India possesses one of the largest microfinance industries in the 
world.
23
  Microfinance in India began in the 1980s.
24
 By 2004, the 
industry’s presence in the country consisted of 188 million accounts, 
representing 18% of the nation’s total population.25  In 2008, India 
experienced a 65% borrower growth rate,
26
 and by 2010, it possessed the 
largest and most concentrated microfinance industry in the world.
27
 
The public persona of India’s microfinance industry has changed 
dramatically over the past decade.  Once lauded, the industry recently 
experienced a large backlash that has spurred widespread regulatory efforts.  
This Part examines India’s legal framework, which serves as the forum for 
these regulatory efforts as well as the basis for their controversy.  This Part 
also provides the necessary background for understanding the microfinance 
industry and the current demand for the industry’s reform by examining the 
establishment of microfinance generally as well as its evolution in India. 
A.  India’s Legal Infrastructure 
In order to understand the regulation of India’s microfinance industry, 
it is essential to have some understanding of the country’s legal 
infrastructure.  India is governed by a constitution, implemented in 1950, 
that guarantees equal rights to all citizens and prohibits discrimination 
 
 23  Sanjay Sinha & Shweta S. Banerjee, India’s Microfinance Industry: An Anatomy of 
Risk for April 2012, CONSULTATIVE GROUP ASSIST POOR (May 6, 2012), 
http://www.cgap.org/blog/india%E2%80%99s-microfinance-industry-anatomy-risk-april-
2012. 
 24  M.S. Sriram & Rajesh S. Upadhyayula, The Transformation of the Microfinance 
Sector in India: Experiences, Options, and Future, 6 J. OF MICROFINANCE, 2004, at 89, 
available at http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/~mssriram/jmf.pdf. 
 25  Robert Peck Christen, Richard Rosenberg, & Veena Jayadeva, Financial Institutions 
with a “Double-Bottom Line”: Implications for the Future of Microfinance, OCCASIONAL 
PAPER (Consultative Grp. to Assist the Poor, D.C.), July 2004, available at 
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2701/OP8.pdf. 
 26  Microfinance Information Exchange, The Microbanking Bulletin No. 19, 5 (Sept. 
2009), available at http://www.cerise-microfinance.org/IMG/pdf/MBB_19_-
_December_2009.pdf. 




based on race, ethnicity, gender, caste, or religion.
28
  India’s Constitution 
also contains “directive principles of state policy,” which “require the 
government to set goals for the welfare of the people, such as a minimum 
wage, jobs for people from disadvantaged backgrounds, and subsidized 
medical care.”29 
Based largely on the United Kingdom’s system of government, India’s 
Constitution divides the federal government into three branches: executive, 
legislative, and judicial.  The executive branch consists of the President, 
Vice President, and Prime Minister.
30
  The bicameral legislative branch,
31
 
also known as Parliament, or Sansad, is composed of an upper house (the 
Council of States, or Rajya Sabha) and a lower house (the House of People, 
or Lok Sabha).
32
  The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, which is 
the ultimate interpreter of the constitution and the laws of India, as well as 
High Courts at the state level and a hierarchy of Subordinate Courts.
33
 
Laws or amendments to India’s Constitution are made by Parliament.34  
An amendment bill must be passed by a two-thirds majority vote in both 
Houses of Parliament.
35
  Furthermore, certain amendments, which pertain to 
the federal nature of the constitution, must be ratified by a majority of state 
legislatures.
36
  The constitution provides for judicial review by the Supreme 
Court and High Courts, which extends to every governmental or executive 
action, including all legislation.
37
 
India uses a common law legal system based on the English model.
38
  
One feature of the Indian Constitution that differentiates it from the U.S. 
Constitution is that, while there are separate federal and state laws with 
 
 28  INDIA CONST. art. 14–15; Navoneel Dayanan, Cornell L. School Asian Am. L. 
Students’ Ass’n & LLM Ass’n, Overview of Legal Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region (Apr. 
10, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=lps_lsapr. 
 29  Dayanan, supra note 28. 
 30  World Factbook, supra note 4. 
 31  However, the legislative bodies for many Indian states, such as Andhra Pradesh, are 
unicameral.  Origin and Growth, AP ONLINE, 
http://www.aponline.gov.in/quick%20links/legislature/legislature.html  (last visited Nov. 19, 
2011). 
 32  World Factbook, supra note 4. 
 33  Indian Judiciary, MAPS INDIA (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://www.mapsofindia.com/events/republic-day/india-judiciary.html. 
 34  Gurram Ramachandra Rao, India: Judicial Review in India, MONDAQ (Apr. 10, 2003), 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=20649. 
 35  Constitution Amendment Bills, PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE: LOK SABHA, 
http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/abstract/constitution_amendment_bills.htm (last visited May 
22, 2013). 
 36  Id. 
 37  Rao, supra note 34. 
 38  Dayanan, supra note 28. 
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predefined areas of application, India has a single integrated court system 
that administers both federal and state laws.
39
  The Supreme Court of India 
is the highest court, under which there are High Courts, presiding over one 
or a group of states.  Below the High Courts are a hierarchy of Subordinate 
Courts, state courts divided into Judicial Districts presided over by a 




The Supreme Court and the High Courts of India are the two 
“constitutional courts” vested with the power to protect the fundamental 
rights of citizens and interpret the constitution and other laws.
41
  The 
Supreme Court, located in New Delhi, is comprised of the Chief Justice of 
India and twenty-five other Judges appointed by India’s President.42  Its 
exclusive original jurisdiction extends to any dispute between the federal 
government and one or more states, or between the states themselves.
43
  
There are twenty-one High Courts in India, each having jurisdiction over at 
least one state.
44
  While they work under the guidance and supervision of 
the Supreme Court, “no direct administrative control is exercised by the 
latter that may in any way affect the functioning of the High Courts as 
independent judicial institutions.”45  Supreme Court decisions are 
considered binding law, while High Court decisions are binding only in 
respect to their state jurisdiction.
46
 
It is under this framework that both state and federal regulation of the 
microfinance industry, as well as potential rulings on the constitutionality of 
these regulations, occurs. 
B.  The Roots of Microfinance 
Microfinance in its modern form is a relatively new industry, not just 
in India, but worldwide.  Globally, needy individuals have traditionally 
lacked access to the financial services provided by banks, regardless of the 
sum of money involved.
47
  One of the primary reasons for this is the 




 39  Id. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Dayanan, supra note 28. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. 
 47  About Microfinance, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/microfinance (last visited Feb. 
5, 2012). 
 48  JOHN O. OGBOR, ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A STRATEGIC 




Another major reason is that the poor lack assets that can be used as 
collateral to secure loans, providing banks with little recourse against 
defaulting borrowers.
49
  As a result of being denied access to credit services 
from formal banking and lending institutions, impoverished individuals’ 
access to credit was limited to either traditional development programs— 
which were criticized for failing to reach the world’s neediest50—or to 
moneylenders
51
 known for their predatory lending practices.
52
 
Modern microfinance developed as a solution to the poor’s need for 
access to credit.  The industry materialized in the 1970’s in response to the 
“widespread perception that traditional development programs, funded by 
international agencies such as the World Bank . . . largely failed to reach the 
world’s poorest or to improve their life chances.”53  Furthermore, research 
shows that not only were these programs failing to reach their intended 
recipients, they actually undermined the developmental goals they were 
intended to carry out.
54
  Microfinance was established to provide a 
mechanism for putting money “directly into the hands of the poor” in a 
manner that would immediately impact their economic prospects.
55
 
Given its goal of providing credit solutions to an under-served 
population, microfinance clearly started with an altruistic slant.  In its initial 
phases, microfinance involved a standard procedure.  Money would be lent 
to the needy; the principal amount would then be collected, with interest, 
and the proceeds from the collected payment would be contributed to a pool 
of capital that would be re-lent to other borrowers.
56
  It was intended that 
borrowers would use the loaned money to fund small entrepreneurial 
 
 49  Id.; see also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN 
THE THIRD WORLD 162 (1989) (discussing the limited scope of the poor’s assets). 
 50  Kenneth Anderson, Microcredit: Fulfilling or Belying the Universalist Morality of 
Globalizing Markets?, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 92 (2002). 
 51  A moneylender is defined as “a person whose main or subsidiary occupation is the 
business of advancing and realising loans.”  RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE 
TECHNICAL GROUP SET UP TO REVIEW LEGISLATIONS ON MONEY LENDING § 4.5 (2007), 
available at http://rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&ID=513.  
Typically for an unincorporated individual, or small group of individuals, a moneylender 
uses their own funds to offer consumer credit and agricultural loans in the form of cash to 
members of a limited geographic region, often restricting their activity to the town where 
they reside.  Id. § 3.3.  While various news articles and academic works alternate between 
the spellings “money-lender” and “moneylender,” this Comment uses the term 
“moneylender” for the sake of consistency. 
 52  M. P. Vasimalai & K. Narender, Microfinance for Poverty Reduction: The Kalanjiam 
Way, 42 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1190, 1193 (Mar. 31, 2007). 
 53  Anderson, supra note 50. 
 54  See, DALE W. ADAMS, DOUGLAS H. GRAHAM & J. D. VON PISCHKE, UNDERMINING 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT WITH CHEAP CREDIT (1984). 
 55  Anderson, supra note 50. 
 56  Id. at 91. 
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enterprises, which would hopefully provide them with an ongoing source of 
income.
57
  A microlender may, for example, loan a borrower enough money 
to cover the cost of a goat.  Upon purchasing the goat, the borrower would 
be able to produce and sell the goat’s milk.  The profits from these sales 
would allow the borrower to maintain a constant income stream.  Thus, 
rather than providing the borrower with temporary relief from financial 
distress, the microloan was intended to provide the borrower with an 
enduring source of financial support. 
In the initial phases of microfinance, government agencies were the 
primary providers of “productive credit” to the needy.58  These lending 
programs, heavily subsidized by international donors, were criticized due to 
their large loan losses and the lending organizations’ frequent need to 
recapitalize, or put new money into their business, in order to continue 
operations.
59
  This led to microfinance in its modern form, rooted primarily 
in the private sector, as a market-based solution that quickly became viewed 
as “an integral part of the financial system.”60 
Traditionally, microfinance programs possessed two features that 
drove their success.  First, impoverished people, particularly women, had 
excellent repayment rates that were often better than the formal financial 
sectors of most developing countries.
61
  Second, “the poor were willing and 
able to pay interest rates that allowed [microlenders] to cover their costs.”62  
Thus, microlenders were able to function sustainably while reaching a large 
number of clients.  Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, microfinance 
was viewed as a tool of socioeconomic development, and was operated 
overwhelmingly as a non-profit enterprise, concentrated in developing 
countries throughout South Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
63
 
Efforts to establish and implement microfinance were lauded 
worldwide.  One of the most exalted figures in microfinance is Muhammad 
Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and one of the 
industry’s pioneers.64  The Grameen Bank arose out of a study conducted by 
Yunus, then a professor at the Chittagong University in Bangladesh, in 
which he interviewed impoverished residents of villages surrounding the 
 
 57  Id. 
 58  LEDGERWOOD, supra note 1, at 2. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  The History of Microfinance, GLOBAL ENVISION (Apr. 14, 2006), 
http://globalenvision.org/library/4/1051/. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. 





University in order to better understand their experiences with poverty.
65
  
He concluded that the reason people were poor was that they “lacked access 
to credit at reasonable interest rates and under appropriate conditions.”66  
Yunus attempted, unsuccessfully, to convince traditional banks to lend 
small amounts of money to the needy.
67
  The inability of traditional banks 
to provide adequate financing led him to conclude that “specialized 
financial institutions” were needed to provide these loans.68  Such 
institutions would need to be willing to provide loans to the impoverished 
individuals on terms and conditions that were appropriate for them.
69
 
Yunus established the Grameen Bank using a model that was quite 
distinct from the traditional banking model.  Strict qualification criteria 
were established to ensure a focus on the needy.
70
  In order to provide 
incentives for repayment, the bank implemented an innovative lending 
scheme in which borrowers were required to form groups of five and 
“accept joint responsibility for repayment of loans.”71  The ability to access 
future credit was conditioned upon repayment of each group members’ 
loan.
72
  Another unique feature of the Grameen Bank’s model was that 
small loans were repaid in weekly installments over the period of one 
year.
73
  Furthermore, rather than require borrowers to travel to the bank for 
service, Grameen Bank workers traveled to the borrowers’ homes to 
provide service.
74
  This innovative framework distinguished the Grameen 
Bank from its peers in its ability to address the specific needs of the poor. 
Under this model, the Bank began in 1976 as a research project that 
served one local village and soon spread to neighboring villages.
75
  In 1983, 
the government of Bangladesh recognized the Grameen Bank as an 
independent bank.
76
  The bank grew rapidly, expanding both in loan 
coverage and volume.
77
  In 2006, the organization and its founder were 
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jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, placing the microfinance industry in 
the international spotlight.
78
  Today, the Bank boasts that it is “owned by 
the poor whom it serves,” with borrowers owning 90% of its shares and the 
Bengali Government owning the remaining 10%.
79
 
While the Grameen Bank appears to have preserved its philanthropic 
roots by maintaining a structure that functions primarily to serve the needy, 
not every microfinance institution (MFI)
80
 can say the same.  Over time, the 
industry’s rapid growth has coincided with a shift from operations being 
funded primarily by the state or charitable donations to being largely 
dominated by the private sector.
81
  With this has come a shift from non-
profit to for-profit business models.  While this transformation has occurred 
worldwide, it is especially salient in India.  The repercussions of this shift in 
India are discussed in more depth in the following subpart. 
C.  Evolution of Microfinance in India 
As is the case in many other countries, microfinance in India was 
traditionally operated under a non-profit model.  The origins of 
microfinance in India can be traced back to the early 1970s when the Self 
Employed Women’s Association of the State of Gujarat created an urban 
cooperative bank, with the objective of offering banking services to 
impoverished women employed in rural parts of the state.
82
  The industry 
evolved in the 1980s around self-help groups (SHGs), which are “informal 
bodies that would provide their clients with much-needed savings and credit 




Like other countries that have embraced the industry, the foundation of 
India’s microfinance industry rests on the failure of state-owned financial 
institutions to extend credit to the poor as well as the disappointing 
performance of government programs intended to alleviate poverty by 
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providing those in need with resources for self-employment.
85
  The industry 
operates on the assumption that “the core of poverty lies in the realm of the 
‘economic’ and credit (debt) is an effective tool that helps the poor tackle 
the problem of deprivation, improve their welfare and social acceptance and 
credibility.”86  In India, “the industry has grown under two different 
systems of patronage.”87 The first system, linked to the National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD),
88
 has the patronage of the 
state as well as formal banking institutions.
89
  A parallel system is funded 
exclusively through the private sector.
90
  Due to the government’s lack of 
involvement, the latter system traditionally functioned outside of any 
formalized legal or regulatory framework.
91
 
Rapid development within India’s microfinance industry brought 
significant diversification.  Today, Indian MFIs range from “Grameen-
replicator [non-government organizations (NGOs)] to for-profit 
entrepreneurial ventures to developmental NGOs.”92  Private sector MFIs 
dominate the industry, demonstrating a shift from the overwhelmingly 
government and charity-sponsored MFIs that founded the industry in India.  
Recent data indicates that over one thousand MFIs operate in India,
93
 and 
“the top five private sector MFIs reach more than 20 million clients in 
nearly every state in India.”94  One of the reasons proffered for this shift is 
“private sector institutions are able to attract increasingly large amounts of 
private capital,” which “accelerate[s] the growth of the industry.”95  
 
 85  Tara A. Nair, Institutionalising Microfinance in India: An Overview of Strategic 
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 86  Id. 
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WKLY. 1695, 1695 (2005). 
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activities in rural areas, promote integrated and sustainable rural development and secure 
prosperity of rural areas.”  About NABARD, NAT’L BANK FOR AGRIC. & RURAL DEV., 
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Furthermore, India, with its immense impoverished population and well-
established microfinance tradition, offered a captive market from which 
private sector MFIs could derive significant profits. 
The shift from public to private sector may be best exemplified by 
SKS Microfinance Ltd., India’s largest MFI by assets.96  Founded in 1997, 
SKS began its operations as an NGO known as SKS NGO or SKS 
Society.
97
  After several years of operating under this model, SKS’s 
management, aware of the company’s vast capacity to produce revenue, 
found itself constrained by the non-profit model.
98
  In 2003, as a response to 
the growing demand for microfinance, SKS Society created a private 
company called SKS Microfinance Private Limited.
99
  SKS transitioned its 
lending operations to this corporate form and continued to gain momentum, 
leveraging its equity to raise debt from the public and private sector as well 
as multinational banks operating in India.
100
  Among its investors was 
Sequoia Capital, a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley that participated in 
an $11.5 million private share offering by SKS in March 2007.
101
  In May 
2009, SKS was converted into a public limited company,
102
 and on July 28, 
2010, the company made its debut on the Bombay Stock Exchange.
103
  The 
IPO resulted in $350 million in sales and a 30% increase in SKS’s stock 
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  At the end of 2010, SKS’s future appeared bright as it boasted 
more borrowers than any other MFI in India.
105
  Unfortunately, as Part III 
illustrates, 2011 did not bode well for SKS. 
III. STATE REGULATION OF MICROFINANCE IN ANDHRA 
PRADESH 
In 2010, India’s microfinance industry was a successful sector.  
Moreover, Indian society embraced the microfinance industry, especially 
the needy whom the industry claimed to benefit.  The industry experienced 
rapid growth, and with rapid growth came an increasingly watchful 
governmental gaze.  This Part discusses the backlash faced by the 
microfinance industry in the wake of its success as well as the resulting 
state regulation. 
A.  Backlash Against the Microfinance Industry 
From its initial phases through the height of its success, India’s 
microfinance industry was viewed as the “silver bullet to uplift the poor.”106  
What appears to be one of the most significant factors in its rapid growth 
and success is the industry’s ability to combine altruism with capitalism.  
While some say increased capital is necessary to reach more borrowers,
107
 
others view for-profit MFIs, and in particular, publicly traded MFIs, as 
offering the “chance of making money out of poor people.”108 
Regardless of whether MFIs’ intentions are purely altruistic, purely 
capitalistic, or a combination of the two, it is clear that the industry’s rapid 
growth and increasing profits have drawn a significant amount of criticism.  
Critics often point to SKS’s IPO as the cause of increased scrutiny toward 
the industry.  S.P. Tusian, an investment adviser and analyst at Premium 
Investments in Mumbai, stated: “The SKS IPO opened [up] Pandora’s box.  
The IPO brought SKS under the scanner and, along with it, the realization 
of the practices of other microfinance institutions, too.”109  Extensive media 
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coverage of the IPO and the company’s public filings revealed SKS’s 
business practices for the first time.  Once these practices came to light, 
Indian citizens and government officials were troubled by what they saw. 
One area of criticism targeted the interest rates that MFIs charged.  
While not as high as the rates charged by moneylenders, MFIs’ interest 
rates varied between 25% and 100%.
110
  These rates were much higher than 
those associated with bank loans.
111
  Commercial MFIs claimed that interest 
rates needed to be this high in order to cover the costs of making thousands 
of microloans.
112
  Unlike banks, MFIs do not collect deposits; working 
capital, therefore, comes from the principal and interest collected from 
borrowers.
113
  High interest rates are likely instituted, at least partially, to 
maximize liquidity. 
The practice of lending is expensive, even for small loans, particularly 
when considered in relation to the size of the transactions involved.
114
  “A 
$100 dollar loan, for example, requires the same personnel and resources as 
a $2,000 one,” notes one commentator, “thus increasing per unit transaction 
costs.”115  The high interest rates also likely account for the heightened risk 
associated with lending to individuals who would be denied credit at formal 
banking institutions. 
Critics, however, say the rates charged by MFIs are exorbitant and 
exploitive of the poor who, with limited options, must resort to microloans 
regardless of the associated interest rate, fueling a cycle of indebtedness.
116
  
One borrower, addressing this cycle, stated: “I understand that it is credit, 
that you have to pay interest, and your debt grows.  But sometimes the 
problems we have seem like they can only be solved by taking another loan.  
One problem solved, another created.”117 
Moreover, the Indian microfinance industry was accused of employing 
predatory collection practices.  Borrowers complained of harassment by 
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  Reportedly, agents went as far as showing up at borrowers’ 
doorsteps, demanding loan repayment, and making threats to those who 
failed to repay.
119
  In one instance, three agents showed up at a woman’s 




Multiple lending is another problem stemming from the growth of the 
microfinance industry.  The industry’s growth resulted in a large number of 
MFIs competing with each other for borrowers.
121
  This market saturation 
allowed customers to take out loans from a large number of lenders that 
were desperate for customers, before paying off existing loans.
122
  As one 
commentator notes: “[C]ommercial lenders cut costs by poaching loan 
officers from their rivals and targeting the same borrowers.  This allow[ed] 
them to collect a higher return on equity as they [did not] have to invest in 
new communities, which normally require[d] training and preparation in 
how to use microfinance.”123  This increased competition even led some 
MFIs to extend multiple loans to a single borrower.
124
 
The lending practices utilized by MFIs concerned experts, who feared 
that borrowers were being encouraged to take on more debt than they could 
handle.
125
  The significant over-indebtedness in the Indian population that 
MFIs were designed to serve led to increased pressure among borrowers 
that some say has had catastrophic consequences.  Indian press and 
government officials linked both stress-related deaths and increased suicide 
rates among the needy to their inability to repay microloans.
126
  MFIs 
claimed that for the suicides they investigated that were attributed to their 
lending, “microloans were among the smallest of the many problems of the 
people that have killed themselves.”127  The string of suicides, nonetheless, 
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spurned a rash of hostility toward MFIs. 
With the microfinance industry facing an onslaught of negative 
publicity, Indian citizens began to express concern that MFIs were allowing 
profit-seeking business practices to overshadow altruistic intentions.  While 
the poor suffered, MFIs were accused of “unseemly enrichment by 
promoters and senior executives.”128  Critics alleged “the surge in for-profit 
MFIs driven by equity investors has skewered the industry away from its 
pro-poor roots.”129  In an attempt to defend the microfinance industry, one 
MFI executive blamed “rogue” lenders for the backlash, pleading, “[d]o not 
destroy the entire industry because of the actions of a few rogue players.”130  
Clearly, however, the entire industry was under scrutiny.  Although it may 
have primarily stemmed from the actions of a few money-driven “rogue 
players,” the entire industry was shrouded in a cloak of criticism.  With this 
widespread criticism bringing the microfinance industry into the 
government’s purview, government intervention was imminent. 
B.  Andhra Pradesh’s Microfinance Regulation 
The criticism targeting the microfinance industry in 2010 was 
especially noticeable in the State of Andhra Pradesh.  Andhra Pradesh, 
situated on the southeastern coast of India, experienced widespread 
microlending activity.  In 2010, “[m]ore than a third of the 30 million 
households that [used] micro-credit in India live[d] in Andhra Pradesh.”131  
Of those who took microcredit, many experienced the effects of over-
indebtedness; the government estimated that families who took out 
microloans in Andhra Pradesh had an average debt of $660 and an average 
annual income of $1060.
132
 
India’s poor have a large political vote.  When politicians became 
aware of the harms experienced by borrowers at the hands of MFIs, they 
saw an opportunity to intervene in an industry many were already beginning 
to view with suspicion.
133
  Andhra Pradesh responded to the complaints by 
developing regulations that severely restricted microlending practices.  The 
State began curbing the interest MFIs could collect.  In the fall of 2010, 
“State regulators . . . ordered a freeze on loan repayments where the interest 
exceeds the principal.”134  Furthermore, Andhra Pradesh politicians urged 
borrowers to stop making loan payments altogether.
135
  Full-blown 
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regulation was cemented in December of 2010 when the Andhra Pradesh 
State Assembly approved the Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions 
(Regulation of Moneylending) Act, 2010 (Act).
136
 
The Act contains many provisions that severely restrict MFIs’ lending 
and collection practices.  First, the Act requires all MFIs operating in 
Andhra Pradesh to register with the State.
137
  Upon registration, MFIs must 
indicate: 
[T]he villages or towns in which they have been operating or propose 
to operate, the rate of interest being charged or proposed to be 
charged, system of conducting due diligence and system of effecting 
recovery and list of persons authorized for conducting the activity of 
lending or recovery of money which has been lent.
138
 
The Act also imposes restrictions on multiple loans.
139
  Furthermore, 
the Act caps interest rates and requires government approval of margins 
between borrowing costs and interest rates.  The Act prescribes that “no 
MFI shall recover from the borrower towards interest in respect of any 
loans advanced by it . . . an amount in excess of the principal amount.”140  
The Act also requires that MFIs maintain detailed documentation and 
account records that can be produced, inspected, or seized by Andhra 
Pradesh officials.
141
  Finally, the Act institutes severe penalties for coercive 
or predatory collection practices.
142
 
The Act was a catastrophic blow to the microfinance industry.  The 
limitations on interest rates and state-backed lack of repayments cut off a 
major source of liquidity for struggling MFIs.
143
  The collection rates of 
most Andhra Pradesh-based MFIs fell from 99% before the issuance of the 
Act to around 20% following the promulgation of the Act.
144
  Worsening 
matters for MFIs, banks and other investors “turned off the credit tap that 
allows microfinance lenders to operate” in the months following the Act’s 
adoption because of concern over repayment and profitability under the new 
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  Bhartiya Samruddhi Finance Ltd., India’s oldest MFI, had 
almost half its loan portfolio in Andhra Pradesh at the time of the Act’s 
passage.
146
  It reported a net loss of 5.8 billion rupees (over 106 million 
U.S. dollars) for 2011–12.147 
In addition to its crippling financial impact, the Act had a 
delegitimizing effect on the microfinance industry.
148
  State-sponsored 
resistance to loan repayment diminished the authority of MFIs, and officials 
say there has been a cascading effect on the repayment habits of borrowers 
in other states.
149
  Furthermore, the Act drew not just nationwide, but 
worldwide attention to the overly aggressive and profit-driven practices of 
some microlenders.
150
  The attention garnered by the Act focused on the 
negative aspects of the industry without differentiating between the for-
profit MFIs engaged in predatory practices and legitimate MFIs.
151
  In fact, 
there was little differentiation between for-profit and not-for-profit MFIs, 
causing even the most philanthropic organizations’ reputations to suffer.152  
The executive director of a large network of non-profit MFIs stated: “It’s 
not only the bad boys that will get hit. Everyone will get hit. People can’t 
differentiate between who are the good boys and who are the bad boys.”153  
Based on the widespread consequences of the Act, it appeared that India’s 
future would become one absent of microlenders, a disturbing reality for 
those who viewed microloans as a means of empowerment. 
The entire country watched as the microfinance business was 
criticized, regulated, and ground to a halt in Andhra Pradesh.  Given the 
extensive media coverage the microfinance industry was generating, the 
Indian government felt compelled to address the industry’s federal 
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IV. FEDERAL REGULATION: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
(DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION) BILL 
In the wake of the events in Andhra Pradesh, India’s federal 
government determined that a national level response was in order.  
Consequently, the Ministry of Finance proposed the Microfinance 
Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill (Bill), which was released 
for comment in July of 2011.
154
  The Bill was introduced to Parliament on 
May 22, 2012 and is currently awaiting parliamentary approval.
155
 
Recognizing that MFIs have the potential to play an important role in 
an inclusive financial system, the Bill seeks “to create uniform policies for 
regulation and development of the [microfinance] sector,” rather than 
restrict the microfinance industry to the point of futility.
156
  “The MFI sector 
has a lot of potential,” stated Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC) India Chief Naina Lal Kidwai, “but it needs to have a 
defined set of rules to function in a proper way.”157  The Bill defines the 
industry’s boundaries and provides a much-needed element of certainty.  
The Bill requires existing microlenders to register with the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI),
158
 which will assume a supervisory role with the power to 
dictate the margins MFIs are allowed to have between their own borrowing 
costs and the fees and interest rates MFIs charge.
159
  Other factors included 
in RBI’s regulatory scope include permissible loan amounts, methods of 
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recovery, and location of operations.
160
  MFIs’ compliance with these 
directives “will determine their future scope of services, ability to mobilize 
various types of finance and to be part of the mainstream financial 
system.”161  RBI will also be empowered to delegate responsibility to the 
National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) when it 
deems such a delegation suitable.
162
  Additionally, RBI has the power to 
impose monetary penalties for any contravention of the Bill’s provisions.163 
Notably, the Bill mandates that “the provisions of this Act shall have 
effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any 
other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by 
virtue of any such law.”164  This clause of the Bill, entitled “Act to have 
overriding effect,” clearly indicates that the Bill’s drafters intended the Bill 
to override conflicting state laws, such as the one in Andhra Pradesh.
165
  
Furthermore, the Bill explicitly clarifies that MFIs do not include “any 
individual carrying on the activity of money-lending and registered as a 
moneylender under the provision of any State law,” providing additional 
assurance that MFIs cannot be regulated by states.
166
 
MFIs have responded favorably to the Bill.
167
  Companies expect that 
the Bill will allow them to expand their businesses
168
 and collect 
outstanding loans.
169
  Many industry insiders believe it will lend credibility 
to the industry by bringing MFIs into the realm of organized financial 
services.
170
  Furthermore, assuming that the Bill will override any state 
regulation of the industry, such as the Act in Andhra Pradesh, MFIs will 
have the opportunity to avoid the state-imposed restrictions, which are 
substantially more severe.  The market appears to support the industry’s 
positive outlook on the Bill.  On the day following the Bill’s public release, 
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SKS posted a 20% gain in trading on the Bombay Stock Exchange, closing 
at 411 rupees after opening at 333.50 rupees.
171
  However, the Bill’s 
reception has not been entirely positive, as evidenced by Andhra Pradesh’s 
strong objections to the Bill.  These objections have the potential to 
interfere with the Bill’s adoption. 
V. ISSUES POSED BY THE BILL 
India’s proposed microfinance bill has had a polarizing effect on the 
country.  While many analysts believe the Bill will succeed in providing 
significant solutions to the challenges faced by both the microfinance 
industry and the individuals whom it serves, others, including the State of 
Andhra Pradesh, staunchly oppose the Bill.  The arguments proffered by the 
Bill’s opponents fall into two veins of logic.  The first has a constitutional 
basis.  Opponents argue that India’s Constitution explicitly vests states with 
the power to regulate the microfinance industry, and thus the Bill’s attempt 
to control something solely within the state’s purview amounts to an 
unconstitutional usurpation of power.
172
  The second argument rests on the 
Bill’s policy implications.  Opponents assert that, by aligning MFIs with 
RBI, the Bill allows microlenders to continue their predatory practices 
under the authority of their alliance with a national institution.
173
  The 
following subparts explore these two arguments, concluding that neither 
offers a sufficient reason for rejecting the Bill’s adoption. 
A.  Constitutional Issue: Division of Legislative Power 
While Parliament is confident the Bill supersedes state laws, Andhra 
Pradesh asserts that the federal government is attempting to control 
something that falls solely within the state’s purview, amounting to an 
unconstitutional usurpation of power.
174
  This argument rests on the division 
of legislative power between state legislatures and Parliament. 
India’s Constitution defines and divides state and federal legislative 
powers into three lists: (1) the Union List, which defines the items 
Parliament has exclusive power to legislate; (2) the State List, which 
defines the items states have exclusive power to legislate; and (3) the 
Concurrent List, which defines the items both Parliament and the states 
have the power to regulate.
175
  India’s Constitution includes a doctrine to 
address conflicts that arise between laws passed on the same subject by the 
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  This doctrine, however, only applies when the subject 
matter of the legislation is on the Concurrent List: 
Where the subject-matter of the legislation in question falls within 
either the Union List or the State list only, then . . . [o]ne of the two 
laws must necessarily be void, because . . . the Indian constitution 
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon Parliament for matters in the 




The constitutionality of the Bill rests, then, on which list encompasses 
microfinance. 
There is no reference to “microfinance” on the Union List, State List, 
or Concurrent List.
178
  Item thirty on the state list, however, is “[m]oney-
lending and money-lenders; relief of agricultural indebtedness.”179  Andhra 
Pradesh claims state governments are authorized to pass a law such as the 
Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions Act because microfinance 
institutions “come under the purview of money-lending activity, and hence, 
the state law.”180  Thus, Andhra Pradesh argues, it is clearly within its 
power to create and enforce its own laws regulating MFIs.
181
  Based on this 
logic, whether the Bill overrides state legislation rests on whether 
microfinance qualifies as “[m]oney-lending.” 
Moneylenders have a tradition in India dating back thousands of years.  
Historically, their sole financial service was to provide loans from their own 
resources.
182
  They are known for charging high interest rates for the small 
loans they issue to the needy, as well as using strong-arm tactics to ensure 
collection.
183
  Moneylenders, referred to as “village loan sharks,”184 are 
typically individuals who lend in the community they reside, operating 
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While some rogue MFIs may seem to be properly characterized as 
moneylenders, there are significant differences between MFIs and 
moneylenders.  Despite the recent emphasis on profits within the industry, 
many MFIs still possess altruistic intentions and are not driven solely by 
financial gain.  Unlike informal moneylenders, these MFIs are registered, 
formal institutions that aim to lend and manage funds used mainly for 
productive activities, engage in a range of financial activities, and typically 
operate as a business collective rather than through individual agents.
186
  
Furthermore, upon adoption of the Bill, microfinance will be a highly 
regulated industry that operates as an extension of the RBI, distinguishing it 
even further from usurious moneylenders.  MFIs that attempt to carry out 
practices typically associated with moneylenders will be estopped by the 
new law. 
In the event the draft Bill becomes law, the definitional distinctions 
between MFIs and moneylenders will likely be insufficient to resolve the 
conflict; Andhra Pradesh has already threatened to bring the issue before 
the Supreme Court.
187
  If the Bill does reach judicial review, it is likely that 
Parliament will be able to successfully assert the power to regulate the 
microfinance industry, thus usurping state regulations.  The Bill’s drafters 
appeared to anticipate Andhra Pradesh’s argument.  As previously 
discussed, the Bill contains language that makes it clear microfinance 
institutions should be distinguished from moneylenders.
188
  Indeed, “the 
most critical part of the Bill is that MFIs registered with the Indian central 
bank won’t be treated as moneylenders.  This essentially means they will be 
kept out of the purview of a state law, which has restricted the operations of 
microlenders.”189  This distinction, however, is not one contrived by 
Parliament solely for the purpose of usurping the Andhra Pradesh’s Act; the 
microfinance industry has historically been viewed as distinct from 
moneylenders, making it more difficult for states to argue they have sole 




 185 Moneylending: Friend or Foe of Microfinance?, INDIA DEV. BLOG (Jan. 28, 2010, 
1:52 AM), http://www.indiadevelopmentblog.com/2010/01/moneylending-friend-or-foe-
of.html. 
 186 What is Microfinance?, CONSULTATIVE GROUP ASSIST POOR, 
http://www.cgap.org/about/faq (Jan. 26, 2013). 
 187 Rai, supra note 20. 
 188 See Micro Finance Bill, supra note 15, § 2(i) (“[M]icrofinance institution . . . does not 
include . . . any individual carrying on the activity of money-lending and registered as a 
moneylender under the provision of any State law which regulates such activities.”). 
 189 Tamal Bandyopadhyay, Can Microfinance Institutions Lower Their Loan Rates?, 
MICROFINANCE AFRICA (Feb. 19, 2013, 9:46 PM) http://microfinanceafrica.net/microfinance-
around-the-world/india-can-microfinance-institutions-lower-their-loan-rates/. 
 190 Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, Killing Microfinance Will Help Moneylenders, 
  
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:711 (2013) 
736 
As an alternative to the characterization of moneylenders, the federal 
government may be able to successfully argue that microfinance, the 
subject-matter of the Bill, should be classified as “banking” or even “the 
Reserve Bank of India,” both of which are items included on the Union 
List.
191
  The Bill establishes a prominent partnership between MFIs and the 
RBI.  This link with a banking partner, as well as the formalized 
requirements the Bill imposes upon MFIs, could bring them into the realm 
of a banking institution.  Furthermore, the constitution provides that 
“Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to any 
matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List.”192  If the federal 
government can successfully argue that MFIs are neither moneylenders nor 
banks, but instead a non-enumerated power, then they also have the ability 
regulate them, overriding any conflicting state regulation. 
While Indian courts have issued varying opinions regarding the scope 
of moneylending,
193
 recent jurisprudence suggests courts will find that 
MFIs fall within Parliament’s authority.  In a February 2013 opinion 
upholding the Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions (Regulation of 
Money Lending) Act, 2010, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh 
acknowledged the federal government’s ability to govern MFIs.194  The 
possibility that a court could determine the definition of moneylenders 
properly includes MFIs is thus unlikely. 
However, even if the Supreme Court believes that microfinance does 
classify as moneylending, the federal government may still be able to 
prevail by asserting Parliament’s power to legislate with respect to a matter 
that is of “national interest.”  The constitution gives Parliament the power to 
legislate on matters enumerated in the State List if they are “necessary or 
expedient in the national interest.”195  The negative impacts of an 
unregulated microfinance industry were felt throughout India, drawing 
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national concern and bolstering support for federal regulation.  India clearly 
has an interest in protecting the poor, a constituency large enough in India 
for their interests to qualify as national interest.  It is this group of 
impoverished individuals that is most susceptible to exploitation by MFIs.  
This, taken in combination with the historic distinction between 
moneylenders and MFIs, the regulation’s partnering of MFIs with RBI, and 
Parliament’s residuary power, gives the government numerous courses to 
ensure the Bill will preempt Andhra Pradesh’s and other state regulations.  
It will be very difficult for Andhra Pradesh to defend its law in the face of 
these arguments. 
B.  Policy Issue: Government Involvement in Private Business 
The Bill’s critics, including the State of Andhra Pradesh, have also 
voiced concern that the Bill prescribes an inappropriate level of government 
involvement in private business.  Opponents argue that intertwining the 
business of the microfinance institutions with that of the banks could be 
dangerous.
196
  They argue: 
[I]f the MFIs become the ‘extended arms of banks’, banks will have 
no reason to push the financial inclusion agenda of the RBI forward.  
As a result, the unserviced, undeveloped rural areas will be ceded by 
the banks to these financing companies leaving them at the mercy of 
the MFIs and their agents.
197
 
Furthermore, critics argue: 
[If] the intention is to equate the MFIs with the banking network, the 
correct course would be to mandate them to convert into banks and 
operate under the banking regulation.  By giving them a status of a 
bank by a back door, the [Bill] allows giving them privileges enjoyed 
by a bank without the concomitant obligations.
198
 
 If the Bill is implemented according to its drafters’ intentions, 
however, aligning the industry with the RBI will necessitate closer 
regulation of the industry, which, in turn will lead to a greater level of 
oversight, higher levels of detection, and more deterrence of the previously 
unrestrained lending practices the public criticizes.  In addition, the 
possibilities that MFIs will have their registration revoked or receive a hefty 
monetary penalty by the RBI in the instance of such conduct serve as 
deterrents that add additional consumer-protection elements to the RBI-MFI 
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partnership.  The likelihood for predatory collection practices and 
exorbitant rates (which are explicitly restricted by the Bill) will 
significantly diminish as a result of the alignment. 
Critics argue that the provision in the Bill that gives the RBI authority 
to delegate power to NABARD undermines the regulatory authority the 
RBI exercises over the microfinance industry.  These critics reason, as the 
primary service provider to SHGs in the microfinance industry, NABARD 
is currently “a key participant in this sector . . . It is widely recognized that 
combining the role of service provider and regulator is not a good 
governance practice, as it could lead to serious conflict of interest.”199  
However, the authorized delegation of authority to NABARD is permissive, 
not mandatory, and given RBI’s supervisory role, it is likely that any 
authority delegated is carefully considered in order to assess potential 
conflicts of interest that could weaken the regulatory system.
200
  Given the 
experience NABARD has in the microfinance sector, it may be more 
capable of identifying weaknesses and points of improvement in the 
regulatory system, providing the potential to actually strengthen the 
regulatory framework. 
Without the proposed Bill, impoverished individuals will be left worse 
off than they are at present.  The unregulated microfinance industry’s 
profits have plummeted over the past year as a result of losing important 
investors and the large state-backed lack of repayment.
201
  This rapid loss of 
capital prevents MFIs from extending loans to those in need.
202
  Despite the 
recent controversy, many impoverished individuals rely on MFIs as their 
only access to the capital that formal banking institutions are unwilling to 
extend.  Foreclosing this option could have detrimental implications for the 
poor. 
Rather than leave the needy worse off, the partnership between the 
RBI and the microfinance industry has the potential to tailor the industry in 
ways that will better service impoverished individuals.  RBI’s credibility, as 
well as its authority, may encourage customers to recommence payments on 
their loans, curbing the liquidity issues caused by widespread lack of 
repayment, and allowing them to continue advancing small loans.  
Furthermore, investors, worried about their exposure to the declining 
microfinance industry, may view the partnership as the security they need 
to continue funding the MFIs.
203
  The partnership prescribed by the Bill is 
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also likely to repair the industry’s tarnished reputation.  The Bill defines 
and adds certainty to the industry’s boundaries, bringing it into the realm of 
organized financial services.  Perhaps this new image can diminish its 
reputation as a wayward, unregulated industry that preys on the poor. 
Additionally, the Bill will cap profits that the industry can make from 
excessive interest rates and fees, forcing it to refocus its values.  This shift 
provides room for the industry to embrace the altruistic slant for which it is 
traditionally known.  Some may worry that the Bill will squelch the 
microfinance industry’s ability to make any money, effectively fending off 
investors and eliminating a much-needed service to the poor.  This view, 
however, assumes overly restrictive government mandates that eliminate 
the possibility for profit, which is not the case.  While the Bill does give the 
RBI the authority to cap profit margins,
204
 it appears to preserve the 
potential for profit.  If one looks to the market for guidance, it appears that 
investors have an optimistic view of the Bill; the Bombay Stock Exchange 
reflected a 20% gain in trading for SKS following the announcement of the 
proposed Bill, suggesting the market is hopeful about the Bill’s impact on 
the industry.
205
  It seems there is an overwhelming possibility that the Bill 
will provide microfinance institutions with the resources they need not only 
to survive, but to provide a truly beneficial service to the needy as well. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
India’s microfinance industry today is at a crossroads: it can continue 
to lose money and be viewed in a negative light, or it can reinvent itself 
through its realignment with the RBI.  Despite the criticism drawn by the 
industry in recent years, microfinance fulfills a social need.  The industry 
offers a unique, frequently utilized service to the poor.
206
  Lacking 
regulation, however, the microfinance industry has expanded without 
bounds, and has done so using tactics that have significantly harmed its 
borrowers.  This conduct has left the industry with a tarnished reputation. 
India’s proposed Bill has the potential to further the positive aspects of 
microfinance that allow it to be a social utility while minimizing or 
eliminating the aspects that cause strife.  The Bill provides certainty 
regarding the industry’s capabilities and limitations, defining permissible 
practices and establishing penalties for unconscionable conduct.  It provides 
a government partner that will bring the legitimacy and security that 
investors require.  Perhaps most importantly, the Bill limits excessive, 
purely profit-driven behavior, refocusing the industry’s function on the 
altruistic foundation it was built on. 
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Andhra Pradesh’s draconian regulation offers no compromise; it 
threatens to regulate the microfinance industry to the point of futility, thus 
limiting the poor’s access to capital.  While the State hopes to assert its law, 
and is willing to challenge the constitutionality of the Bill in the Supreme 
Court, it is likely that the Bill will be found to be constitutional on a variety 
of grounds.  Although moneylending falls within the exclusive legislative 
power of the state, the Bill explicitly distinguishes microfinance from 
moneylending, leaving open the prospect of federal regulation.  
Furthermore, it is possible that microfinance could be classified as either 
“banking” or “the Reserve Bank of India,” both of which explicitly fall 
under the federal government’s legislative purview.  Alternatively, 
microfinance may be deemed a non-enumerated power, in which case it 
would also fall under the federal government’s exclusive legislative 
authority.  Even in the unlikely event the Supreme Court determines that 
microfinance does qualify as moneylending, the federal government could 
still prevail by asserting that microfinance is a matter of “national interest” 
within their legislative authority.  Thus, the Bill will likely survive a 
constitutional challenge, allowing the microfinance industry to survive by 
avoiding overly restrictive regulations from states like Andhra Pradesh. 
Despite recent controversy, altruistic possibilities still exist for India’s 
microfinance industry.  MFIs maintain the potential to provide the poor 
with a vital resource—the capital they are denied by traditional banking 
institutions.  With the right regulation, the industry can add significant 
value to Indian society by providing a service to, rather than imposing a 
burden upon, the needy. 
 
